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Abstract: This paper explores the evolution of interaction and cooperation supported by 
individuals’ changing trust and trustworthiness on directed weighted regular ring though 
agent-based modeling. This agent-based model integrates fragility of trust, interaction decision, 
strategy decision, payoff matrix decision, interaction density and information diffusion. Marginal 
rate of exploitation of original payoff matrix and relative exploitation degree between the original 
and mutated payoff matrices are stressed in trust updating; influence of observing is introduced via 
imagined strategy; relation is maintained through relation maintenance strength. The impact of 
degree of embeddedness in social network, mutation probability of payoff matrix, mutated payoff 
matrix, proportion of high trust agents and probabilities of information diffusion within 
neighborhood and among non-neighbors on the sum of number of actual interaction and 
cooperation of all agents are probed on the base of a baseline simulation, respectively. Under the 
experimental design and parameter values selection in this paper, it is found that basically as 
degree of embeddedness in social network, proportion of high trust agents and probability of 
information diffusion in neighbors increase, as mutation probability of payoff matrix, conflict in 
mutated payoff matrix and probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors decrease, 
interaction and cooperation perform better.  
Keywords: Trust, directed weighted regular ring, agent-based modeling, evolution of cooperation 
Introduction  
Trust as a lubricant permeates almost every aspect of social and economic life. It typically 
functions on human individuals and is reflected in their social and economic interactions. From 
the individuals’ perspective, different personal experiences (including direct interaction 
experiences and observation experiences) may drive different trust of individuals. At the same 
time, individuals’ diverse traits may lead to that their trust gets influenced to different degrees by 
even the same trust-influencing events. Put another way, individuals would not react to the same 
degree to external information; there exist people more easily being influenced. Thus, trust is 
heterogeneous across individuals in a given population. 
The micro interactions can be and are often modeled by games, such as Prisoners’ Dilemmas or 
coordination games et cetera. Cooperation in dilemma-like payoff structure is a remarkable 
research topic in game theory. (e.g., Axelrod, 1984) In research of trust by modeling micro 
interactions by non-cooperative Prisoners’ Dilemmas, diachronic share of cooperation in the 
whole society (number of cooperation over population size) is often adopted as a measure of 
(social) trust. One possible disadvantage of this method is that given the payoff structure, it cannot 
distinguish the different degrees of influences on an agent of trust-increasing and trust-decreasing 
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events. It implies trust-decreasing events have an equivalent impact with trust-increasing events 
(even with very opposite directions). But generally speaking, trust is produced harder but can be 
destroyed easily. Slovic (1993) also states, “It (Trust) typically created rather slowly, but it can be 
destroyed in an instant by a single mishap or mistake”; the “fragile” nature of trust may, added by 
Slovic (1993), result from human psychological disposition to regard trust-destroying news as 
more credible. (Slovic, 1993) However, this characteristic of trust has rarely been considered into 
formal models.   
Trustworthiness, as an inseparable aspect of trust research, can be reflected not only on the chosen 
strategy, but also on the chosen payoff structure. Given a payoff structure, unilateral defection 
destroys partners’ trust; when an individual enlarges the payoff difference between a unilateral 
cooperation and a unilateral defector in the original payoff structure, his unilateral defection 
probably to a larger extent destroys his partners’ trust than in the original payoff structure. Imagine 
a situation that a consumer is going to buy baby formula. The bad situation he has known or he 
can imagine is that at worst the formula is not worth the price he has paid. However, the 
consequence turns out to be that the baby of the consumer gets very sick after drinking the 
formula. The game is still the same one, namely “buying baby formula”, however the payoff 
structure does not consistent with the original one. Thus, it can be said that social trustworthiness 
also mirrors institutional quality: in a society with a relatively perfect institutional system, 
probably less events destroying public trust happen.  
Additionally, people do not definitely participate in a potential interaction. They can make a 
decision not only on which strategy and payoff structure to use in an interaction, but also on 
whether or not to be involved in an interaction (Macy and Skvoretz, 1998). Trust, therein, is a 
crucial factor to enable interactions. (Elsner and Schwardt, 2015)  
As to interactions, the probability of encountering different persons is not the same, which is a 
salient characteristic of social interactions. The random-pairing mechanism actually implies equal 
probability of meeting any other in the whole simulated population. Macy and Skvoretz (1998) 
argue that random-pairing and one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma experiments overlook “the 
embeddedness of the game in social networks”. (Macy and Skvoretz, 1998) High degree of 
embeddedness, in the paper of Macy and Skvoretz (1998), means high probability to reencounter 
each other. Thus, players, in their paper, are endowed with two types of relationships, namely 
neighbors and strangers, and interactions with neighbors are set with high degree of embeddedness 
while interactions with stranger with low embeddedness. (Macy and Skvoretz, 1998) This is a 
much more realistic pairing mechanism since interactions are locally dense in individuals’ 
interaction network.  
Interaction density exists, both between neighbors and strangers and within neighbors.  Hence, 
even within neighborhood, interactions also always accompany partner selections. Besides that 
one’s relationships with others are with “to exist or not to exist”, they are also with different link 
weights. (Newman, 2004) Strength of social ties is a significant characteristic of social 
relationships. When an individual has an opportunity to interact with one of his neighbors, he 
probably would like to interact with those relatively trustworthy.  
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Interactions are a relatively direct experience while non-interactions (for simplicity, observations
1
) 
provide another way to get others’ interaction information. Information both from direct 
interactions and observations is channels that an individual gets to know about the status of the 
whole society. An obvious phenomenon about information diffusion in contemporary era is that its 
channels get more, its coverage gets larger and its speed gets faster. Besides traditional mass 
media, the technological support of improving information technology and internet access, the 
popularization of personal computers and mobile terminals, the emergent new media and the 
diverse on-line social platforms extremely largely improve the probability that an individual 
acquires information. Information acquired through observations (here means non-interactions) 
which is about others’ interactions and contains information of others’ trustworthiness in the 
society shapes the information receivers’ trust. 
It has been realized that taking individuals’ heterogeneity into account in economic researches 
coincides with evolutionary thinking. Gowdy et al (2016) argue that the average behavior of 
representative agents is one of the causes that make the modern economics non-evolutionary. 
(Gowdy et al, 2016, p 327) Modeling heterogeneity is the very strength of agent-based modeling 
(ABM) and is also the core difference between ABM and other methodologies, such as systematic 
dynamics. ABM places “a strong emphasis on heterogeneity and social interactions”. (Banisch, 
Lima and Araújo, 2012) So far, ABM, as a methodology (Niazi and Hussain, 2011), gets more and 
more adopted in research in different fields and different topics of social sciences. (e.g., Axelrod, 
1997; Macy and Willer, 2002; Tran and Cohen, 2004; Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005; Tesfatsion and 
Judd (Eds.), 2006; Gilbert, 2008; Geanakoplos et al, 2012; Elsner et al, 2015, Chapter 9; Chen et 
al, 2015; Caiani et al, 2016, among others) Research on trust with agent-based modeling also 
emerges. (e.g., Kim, 2009; Chen et al, 2015) 
In this paper, agents’ heterogeneity is reflected on three main aspects below: 1) agents’ trust 
(namely, their willingness to participate in a potential interaction in this paper) and their 
trustworthiness (i.e., their probability to cooperate in an actual interaction in this paper); 2) agents’ 
capabilities of acquiring others’ interaction information both from his neighbors and 
non-neighbors, respectively; 3) agents’  trust-updating weights of different acquired interaction 
information (of mutual neighbors or mutual non-neighbors, and from personal interactions or 
observations). As to social interactions, an interaction contains (at least) the decision-makings 
below: 1) whether to initiate (or participate in) a potential interaction; 2) which partner to choose 
if the potential interaction is within neighborhood; 3) which (pure) strategy to use in the actual 
interaction; 4) which payoff matrix to apply. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the evolution of interaction and cooperation supported by 
individuals’ changing trust and trustworthiness on a directed weighted regular ring network under 
different conditions of environment from the angle of micro scope via designing an agent-based 
model. Additionally, what is presented in the experimental design in this paper also provides 
useful insights in research of the decline of trust. 
Section 1 enumerates some interested parameters and their concrete meaning in my agent-based 
model. Section 2 describes the experimental design in detail. Section 3 presents results. Section 4 
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concludes. 
1 Interested parameters 
Before presenting experimental design, it is necessary to figure out some parameters and their 
meaning that we use to explore socio-economic processes underlying trust in our agent-based 
simulation. In a word, they are all about with whom to interact and how, essentially. 
Number of neighbors Number of neighbors in my model refers to how many direct, or immediate, 
or one-degree separated neighbors an individual has. The probability of a given neighbor is chosen 
as an interaction partner is higher if an individual has fewer neighbors ceteris paribus if the 
choosing scope is within his neighborhood.  
Embededness in social network Inspired by Macy and Skvoretz (1998), embeddedness in one’s 
social network here refers to the probability that a potential interaction will be with an immediate 
neighbor. What is more meaningful, social embeddedness can also be used to indicate social 
mobility.  
Mutated payoff matrix Mutated payoff matrix is a mutated version of the original and popular 
payoff matrix. Interactions are modeled as symmetric non-cooperative prisoners’ dilemmas in this 
paper.
1
 The original and the mutated payoff matrix have the same payoff values for pure 
strategies against themselves, while have different payoff values for pure strategies against the 
different pure strategies. The mutated payoff matrix is endowed with a larger interest conflict and 
is used as an ingredient of indicating relative degree of exploitation of the mutated payoff matrix 
over the original payoff matrix.  
Mutation probability of payoff structure It is the probability that the original payoff matrix is 
changed to the mutated payoff matrix by the initiator of a potential interaction on condition that 
the initiator has decided to play “Defection” in the forthcoming actual interaction. This is an 
indicator for institutional quality in this paper. 
Proportion of high trust individuals Proportion of high trust individuals in the whole population 
means the proportion of individuals whose trust is equal to or higher than 2/3 in the whole 
population.
2
 This is a parameter to represent the whole trust status in a society. 
Probability of interaction information diffusing in neighbors It is the probability that the 
interaction information, including the strategies and payoffs of the interaction parties, get spread 
in agents who are neighbors of either of the interaction parties. 
Probability of interaction information diffusing in non-neighbors It is the probability that the 
interaction information, including the strategies and payoffs of the interaction parties, get spread 
in agents who are neighbors of neither of the interaction parties.  
2 Experimental design 
                                                             
1
 It is simply not be distinguished so much between utility payoff and monetary payoff in this paper; they can be 
distinguished in different actual and concrete situations. 
2 The trust level in this paper is a real number within range [0, 1]. 
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2.1 Artificial society and network structure 
Consider an artificial society with n agents. The set of all agents is denoted by a finite set N = {ai | 
1≤ i ≤ n, i ∈ N+} with the subscripts representing the unique identity of a given agent. All agents 
are arranged on a directed weighted regular ring sequentially with an equal number of neighbors. 
ai’s neighbors are those who are nearest to him on the ring. Let Neigi be ai’s neighborhood, then 
Neigi
C 
= N - Neigi - {a} represents ai’s non-neighbor set. All agents can memorize their neighbors’ 
identity but cannot memorize that of non-neighbors. 
2.2 Initialization of agents’ attributes  
Some important attributes of agents and their initialization are stressed here, even though there 
exist some other attributes. Their specific usage will be illustrated in 2.3 in detail. 
2.2.1Trust and trustworthiness 
Both trust and trustworthiness are float numbers in range [0, 1].
1
 If an agent’s trust is equal to or 
higher than 1/2, he is treated as a high trust agent. An agent with probability p
HTr
 (namely 
proportion of high trust individuals in the whole population) is initialized as a high trust agent. 
Agents’ trust in ranges [0, 1/2) and [1/2, 1] follows uniform distribution in corresponding ranges, 
respectively. That is, 
𝑇𝑟𝑖 ,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  ~  
U  
1
2
, 1    if  𝑟𝑖
𝑡𝑟 ∈ [0,𝑝𝐻𝑇𝑟)
U  0,
1
2
      if  𝑟𝑖
𝑡𝑟 ∈ [𝑝𝐻𝑇𝑟 , 1]
  
𝑇𝑟𝑖 ,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  is agent ai’s initial trust. 𝑟𝑖
𝑡𝑟  is a pseudo random number following uniform distribution in 
range [0, 1]. 𝑝𝐻𝑇𝑟  is proportion of high trust individuals in the whole population. Similar with 
trust, one’s trustworthiness is a float number randomly chosen from uniform distribution [0, 1]. 
Namely,  
𝑇𝑟𝑤𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  ~ U 0, 1  
𝑇𝑟𝑤𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  is ai’s initial trustworthiness. 
2.2.2 Probability of information acquisition 
Information acquisition here means that an agent acquires others’ interaction information via 
non-interaction (“observing” hereinafter, for convenience). An agent’s probability of information 
acquisition indicates his capability to obtain and his attention paid to others’ interactions.  
Each agent has two probabilities of information acquisition: 1) probability of acquiring 
information from his neighbors 𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁 ; 2) probability of acquiring information from his 
non-neighbors 𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑛 . They are both randomly chosen from uniform distribution in range [0, 1] 
                                                             
1 Direct relationship between an agent’s trust and his own trustworthiness is not presupposed. This is also in 
accordance with an experimental research of Kiyonari et al (2006) which suggests that trust does not beget 
trustworthiness (Kiyonari et al, 2006).  
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and do not change across time.  
Now, let ai be an observing agent. When a piece of interaction information gets diffused within the 
neighborhoods of two interaction parties, as long as one of the two interaction parties is the 
observing agent’s neighbor, the observing agent would following 𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁  observe; when the piece 
of interaction information gets diffused within non-neighborhoods of the interaction parties, if 
neither of the two interaction parties is the observing agent’s neighbor, the observing agent would 
following 𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑛  observe.  
2.2.3 Weights of four kinds of information sources 
It is assumed that there are four kinds of information sources on which an agent can depend to 
adjust his trust: 1) interactions with neighbors, 2) interactions with non-neighbors, 3) observing 
interactions between two mutual neighbors, and 4) observing interactions between two mutual 
non-neighbors.  
Let 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
 denote ai’s weight of information about mutual neighbors, let 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
 be ai’s weight 
of information about mutual non-neighbors, let 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  represent ai’s weight of information 
acquired through interactions and let 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠  indicate ai’s weight of information acquired via 
observations. All of an agent’s four weights are randomly chosen from uniform distribution on 
range [0, 1] and do not change across time. The weights of four kinds of information sources in 
trust-updating is four linear combinations of either 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
 or 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
and either 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  or 
𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 .
1
 Specifically, we set the weights of four kinds of information sources as follows (see Table 
1): 
Table 1. Weights of four kinds of information sources in ai’s trust-updating 
 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 ~ U 0, 1  𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠~ U 0, 1  
𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
~ U 0, 1  0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
) 0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
) 
𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
~ U 0, 1  0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
) 0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
) 
2.2.4 Unilateral link weights 
Unilateral link weights are what an agent, say ai, depends on to actively choose a neighbor as a 
potential interaction partner when his scope of choosing is within neighborhood, and unilateral 
link weights do not change within time period. A neighbor to whom ai assigns larger unilateral 
link weight is with higher probability to be chosen. All weights that an agent assigns to his 
neighbors sum up to 1. In the first time period, each neighbor of ai is assigned with equal weight 
by ai and with equal probability to be chosen as a potential interaction partner if ai’s choosing 
scope is within neighbors.  
2.3 Micro-level process 
                                                             
1 Here an implicit assumption is that 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
, 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
, 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  and 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠  are mutually independent.  
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Each time period contains 𝜏 = 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  sub-time periods (𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 = 20 in this paper). The 
micro-level process in each time period contains three main tasks: 1) all agents one by one have an 
opportunity to actively make an interaction request (described in 2.3.1), and this rotation repeats 
for 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  times; 2) all agents one by one update their trustworthiness (namely probability to 
cooperate in each actual interaction) for the next time period (described in 2.3.2); 3) all agents one 
by one modify their unilateral link weights for the next time period (described in 2.3.3).  
2.3.1 Interaction, information diffusion and trust-updating 
1) Interaction decision for active potential interactions 
For each sub-period 𝜏 (𝜏 ∈ N+ and 𝜏 ≤ 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 ) in time period t, every agent, in turn in a 
shuffled order, has an opportunity to actively make an interaction request to others. Whether an 
agent will grasp the opportunity and enter the next step of choosing a potential interaction partner 
is determined by his willingness to interact, namely his own trust. That is, ai with a probability 
equal to his trust continues to choose a potential interaction partner.  
Before we go further, I would like to talk about potential interactions. A potential interaction is 
acquired whenever an agent has an opportunity to interact, however has not yet actually interacted. 
Thus, number of potential interactions of an agent i in time period t can be calculated in two 
different ways: 1) It equals number of potential interactions with neighbors 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝐼,𝑁
 plus 
number of potential interactions with non-neighbors 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝐼,𝑁𝑛
, or 2) it equals ai’s active 
interaction requests 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝑃𝐼  plus interaction requests from others (passive interactions) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼 . 
2) To choose a potential interaction partner   
Following Macy and Skvoretz (1998), in this paper the degree of embeddedness in social network 
is also assumed. Degree of embededness in social network, as a parameter, is represented by a 
float number in range [0, 1]. When ai is going to actively propose an interaction request, his 
potential interaction partner will be chosen either from his neighborhood with probability equal to 
degree of embeddedness in social network or from his non-neighborhood with probability equal to 
1 minus degree of embeddedness in social network.
1
  
If ai’s potential interaction partner is definitely going to be chosen from neighborhood, which 
neighbor on earth will be chosen hinges on ai’s unilateral link weights assigned to his neighbors. 
On contrast, if ai’s potential interaction partner is definitely outside his neighborhood, a 
non-neighbor will be randomly chosen among ai’s non-neighbors with equal likelihood.  
Whether ai’s chosen potential interaction partner aj (either a neighbor or a non-neighbor) would 
like to participate in the interaction then depends on aj’s willingness to interact which is 
determined by aj’s own trust. Only if aj agrees to interact, the interaction will actually happen, and 
ai and aj enter the next step of strategy decision; otherwise, the actual interaction won’t happen.  
                                                             
1 “Degree of embededness in social network” here only represents the probability that an agent encounters a 
neighbor in a potential interaction; it does not represent an agent’s subjective willingness to interact with a 
neighbor. 
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3) Pure strategy decision 
Applying which pure strategy for the forthcoming actual interaction is determined by the agents’ 
trustworthiness. If a random number chosen from uniform distribution in range [0, 1] is smaller 
than an agent’s trustworthiness, his strategy will be “Cooperate”; otherwise, his strategy will be 
“Defect”. Hence, each agent is actually using a mixed strategy.  
4) Payoff matrix mutation 
The actual interaction process is modeled by non-cooperative and symmetric prisoners’ dilemmas. 
1
Denote matrix A
g
 as a general form of payoff matrixes of prisoners’ dilemma and set 
𝑨𝑔 =   
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
  
a11 is an agent’s payoff when both he and his partner apply strategy “Cooperation”; a12 is an 
agent’s payoff when he alone uses strategy “Cooperation” while his partner uese strategy “Defect”; 
a21 is an agent’s payoff when he plays strategy “Defect” and his partner plays strategy 
“Cooperation”; a22 is an agent’s payoff when both players apply strategy “Defect”. Then, the 
elements of payoff matrix A
g
 should satisfy 𝑎21 >  𝑎11  >  𝑎22  >  𝑎12  and 𝑎11  >  
𝑎21 + 𝑎12
2
 for a 
game to be a prisoners’ dilemma.  
What is more important for trust-updating later in this paper, we define marginal rate of 
exploitation (MRE) of a given payoff matrix A
g
 as 
𝑀𝑅𝐸Ag ,𝐶/𝐷 =
𝑎11 − 𝑎12
𝑎21 − 𝑎11 
 
𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑔 ,𝐶/𝐷 represents marginal rate of exploitation of pure strategy “Defection” to pure strategy 
“Cooperation” under payoff matrix A
g
. It measures how much a defector can gain from deviating 
one unit of payoff from pure strategy “Cooperation” on the loss of his game partner who is a 
cooperator. MRE is positive. 
Consider two symmetric prisoners’ dilemmas with A and A
mut
 having different numerical payoffs
2
: 
𝑨 =   
𝑎11
𝐴 𝑎12
𝐴
𝑎21
𝐴 𝑎22
𝐴                and          𝑨
𝑚𝑢𝑡 =   
𝑎11
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 𝑎12
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡
𝑎21
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 𝑎22
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡   
Therein, A
mut
 is a mutated version of A. Thus, the marginal rate of exploitation of payoff matrix A 
is: 
𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 =
𝑎11
𝐴 − 𝑎12
𝐴
𝑎21
𝐴 − 𝑎11
𝐴  
                                                             
1  Even though a classical game “Prisoners’ dilemma” in game theory is adopted, strategy updating 
(trustworthiness updating in this paper) is not directly associated with comparison of utility function in this paper.  
2 It is not specified in this paper whether the payoffs are utility or monetary payoffs, not it involves the 
comparability of cardinal utility or ordinal utility; they become more concrete and meaningful in specific situations 
more or less. However, the meaning behind is obvious in real world.   
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Besides the general conditions a prisoners’ dilemma should satisfy, A and A
mut
 in this paper also 
satisfy 𝑎11
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 = 𝑎11
𝐴 , 𝑎22
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 = 𝑎22
𝐴 , 𝑎21
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 > 𝑎21
𝐴  and 𝑎12
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 < 𝑎12
𝐴  to ensure that the mutated 
payoff matrix A
mut
 enlarges the exploitation degree of unilateral defection compared to the original 
payoff matrix A, and to have comparability as well. At the same time, we denote relative 
exploitation degree (RED) of payoff matrix A
mut
 over A as 
𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 /𝐴 =  
𝑎21
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 − 𝑎12
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡
𝑎21
𝐴 − 𝑎12
𝐴  
Relative exploitation degree is constructed to measure to which degree a mutated payoff matrix 
A
mut
 enlarges the interest conflict of the original payoff matrix A.  
Payoff matrix decision comes after pure strategy decision. The initiator (the active interaction 
party) of a potential interaction has an exclusive right to unilaterally change payoff matrix from A 
to A
mut
 with probability p
Amut
 on condition that the initiator has already decided to apply 
“Defection” for this forthcoming actual interaction.
1
 As long as no payoff matrix mutation 
happens, the interaction will carry on with the original payoff matrix A.  
Due to the specific conditions that A and A
mut
 should satisfy in this paper, it is assumed that when 
active actor chooses A
mut
: 1) the passive actor cannot discover he is under A
mut
 unless the passive 
actor plays “Cooperation”; 2) observers cannot either detect their observed interaction is under 
A
mut
 unless the observed interaction is unilateral defect. 
5) To play the game 
After pure strategies and payoff matrix for the forthcoming interaction have been decided, the two 
interaction parties begin to play the game. What each of both interacting parties should record 
through each actual interaction in a current time period is two aspects: a) counting his own actual 
interactions (including both active ones and passive ones) and “Cooperation” (no matter what pure 
strategy his partner uses) no matter whether his partner is a neighbor or a non-neighbor; b) 
counting actual interactions happening with each of his neighbors and “Cooperation” that each of 
his neighbors applies to him according to his neighbors’ identity. All these are reset to zero at the 
beginning of every time period (not sub-time period). Therein, a) is for trustworthiness updating 
and b) is for unilateral link weights updating.  
6) Diffusion of interaction information (Observed by others) 
It is possible that others who are not interacting parties get informed of the situation and result of 
an interaction. Except the two interaction parties, say ai and aj, other agents in the artificial society 
are separated into two sets: one is the union-neighbor set UNeigij in which the agents are 
neighbors of either of the interaction parties; the other is set DNeigij in which agents are neighbors 
of neither of the interaction parties. Thus, when the interaction parties ai and aj are mutual 
neighbors,  
𝑈𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 ∪ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑗 − {𝑎𝑖 ,𝑎𝑗 } 
                                                             
1 Even though mutation probability is very small in nature (Seltzer and Smirnov, 2015), it is not set that small in 
this paper. 
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𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁 − (𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 ∪ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑗 ) 
When the interaction parties ai and aj are mutual non-neighbors, 
𝑈𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 ∪ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑗  
𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁 −  𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 ∪ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑗  − {𝑎𝑖 ,𝑎𝑗 } 
The probability that the interaction information of ai and aj diffuses in these two interacting parties’ 
neighborhoods UNeigi,j is p
IDN
, and the probability diffusing in their non-neighborhoods DNeigi,j is 
p
IDNn
. Both p
IDN
 and p
IDNn
 are random numbers following uniform distribution in range [0,1] and 
act as parameters.  
Then, the interaction information of ai and aj starts “diffusing” separately in UNeigi,j and DNeigi,j. 
Whether an outside agent ak (an agent who is not one of the interacting parties) will get informed 
of the just happening interaction depends on whether he belongs to UNeigi,j or DNeigi,j, and his 
own probability of information acquisition from neighbors 𝑝𝑘
𝐼𝐴𝑁  and from non-neighbors 𝑝𝑘
𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑛 . 
What an observing agent will get informed about others’ interaction is a) the strategy combination, 
that is whether the observed interaction is “mutual cooperation”, “unilateral defection” or “mutual 
defection”; b) the relationship between the observed interacting parties, namely “mutual neighbors” 
or “mutual non-neighbors” and c) the specific payoff matrix, that is whether the payoff matrix is a 
mutated one. Note that A
mut
 can only manifest itself in the situation of unilateral defection because 
A
mut
 has the same values with A in situations of “mutual cooperation” and “mutual defection” 
according to the settings in this paper. 
7) To update self’s trust 
i) Trust-updating directions (qualitative trust-updating) 
Changes of trust have three directions: increase, decrease and remain unchanged. In order to 
clarity how trust changes and when, it is necessary for us to at first distinguish trust-increasing 
events, trust-destroying events and trust-invariant events. This is analyzed from two angles: 
interacting agents and observing agents. 
·Interacting agents 
For the two interacting agents, in the situation of mutual cooperation, both agents’ trust increase; 
in the situation of unilateral defection, the cooperative agent’s trust decreases while the defective 
agent’s trust remains unchanged; in the situation of mutual defection, both agents’ trust keeps 
invariant. (Also see Table 2.) 
·Observing agents 
For an observing agent, he first images which (pure) strategy he would have applied if he had been 
in the interaction. An observing agent’s imagined pure strategy with probability equal to his 
trustworthiness is “Cooperation”. If his imagined (pure) strategy is “Cooperation”, his trust will 
increase when he observes mutual cooperation, and his trust will decrease when he observes 
unilateral defection or mutual defection. If his imagined (pure) strategy is “Defection”, his trust 
will not change. (Also see Table 2.) 
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ii) Quantitative trust-updating 
Quantitative trust-updating is based on a certain amount ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒  which equals 0.005 much 
exactly an agent will update his trust hinges on a) marginal rate of exploitation of payoff matrix A 
(namely, 𝑀𝑅𝐸A,𝐶/𝐷), b) relative exploitation degree of Amut compared to A (namely, 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 /𝐴), 
and c) ai’s own weights for four kinds of information sources (the four possible combinations of 
either 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
or 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
 and either 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 or 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠  shown in Table 1).  
Table 2. Trust-updating directions 
Information acquiring 
method 
Strategy Trust-updating direction 
Interaction self partner self partner 
C C ↑ ↑ 
C D ↓ ---- 
D C ---- ↓ 
D D ---- ---- 
Observation Observed strategy 
combination 
Observer’s imaged strategy 
C D 
Mutual cooperation ↑ ---- 
Unilateral defection ↓ ---- 
Mutual defection ↓ ---- 
·Interacting agents 
Assume ai interacts with his neighbor aj. If both ai and aj apply “Cooperation”,  
𝑇𝑟𝑖 ← min⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑖 + 0.5 ∗  𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
+ 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 1) 
If ai unilaterally uses “Cooperation” under payoff matrix A,  
𝑇𝑟𝑖 ← max⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑖 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝐸
𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 ∗  𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
+ 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 0) 
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If ai unilaterally uses “Cooperation” under payoff matrix A
mut
,  
𝑇𝑟𝑖 ← max⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑖 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝐷
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 /𝐴 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 ∗  𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
+ 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 0) 
When ai’s interaction partner is a non-neighbor aj, 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
 should replace 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
. At the same 
time, aj should also update his trust according to the same rule. 
·Observing agents 
Assume ak observes the interaction between two mutual neighbors ai and aj. If both ai and aj apply 
“Cooperation” and ak’s imaged pure strategy is also “Cooperation”, 
𝑇𝑟𝑘 ← min⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑘 + 0.5 ∗  𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
+ 𝑤𝑘
𝑂𝑏𝑠 ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 1) 
If not both ai and aj apply “Cooperation”, when ak’s imaged pure strategy is “Cooperation” and the 
observed payoff matrix is not A
mut
, 
𝑇𝑟𝑘 ← max⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑘 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝐸
𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 ∗  𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
+ 𝑤𝑘
𝑂𝑏𝑠 ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 0) 
If not both ai and aj apply “Cooperation”, when ak’s imaged pure strategy is “Cooperation” but the 
observed payoff matrix is A
mut
, 
𝑇𝑟𝑘 ← max⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑘 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝐷
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 /𝐴 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 ∗  𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
+ 𝑤𝑘
𝑂𝑏𝑠 ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 0) 
When ak observes an interaction happening between two mutual non-neighbors, 𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
 should 
replace 𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
.  
2.3.2 To update self’s trustworthiness 
Agents’ updating of their own trustworthiness is considered as a process of strategy learning. We 
constrain the objects of an agent’s strategy-learning within his neighbors. Every agent updates his 
trustworthiness near the end of a time period. What needs to be done for an agent ai is searching 
out his neighbor, say 𝑎𝑗0 , with the highest number of passive potential interactions from neighbors 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼 ,𝑁
 in the current time period. If 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼 ,𝑁
 is larger than ai’s own number of passive 
potential interactions 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼 ,𝑁
 and if j0’s number of actually interaction is not 0, ai would 
switch his trustworthiness to 𝑎𝑗0’s cooperation rate of  𝑅𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐶 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑗0,𝑡
𝐶
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑗0,𝑡
𝐴𝐼      𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼 ≠ 0  in the 
current time period t and take it as his (mixed) strategy for the next time period; otherwise, ai 
would maintain his current trustworthiness over to the next time period. The reason why the base 
of strategy learning is set at agents’ cooperation rate of a current time period t rather than agents’ 
probability of cooperation in an interaction is that it is assumed that an agent’s probability of 
cooperation in an interaction is not observable for other agents while his cooperation rate is, on 
contrast. 
Formally, let Neigi represent the set of ai’s neighbor set in which his strategy-learning candidates 
are in time period t and aj be an arbitrary element in Neigi. The agent aj0 with the highest number 
of passive potential interactions in the current time step t in Neigi satisfis 
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𝑗0 = argmax𝑗   𝑗    𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼 ,𝑁 ,𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖} 
Thus, 
𝑇𝑟𝑤𝑖,𝑡+1 =   
𝑅𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐶         if 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼 ,𝑁 >  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼 ,𝑁
𝑇𝑟𝑤𝑖,𝑡                                 otherwise
  
Therein 
𝑅𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐶 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐶
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼      𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼 ≠ 0   
𝑅𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐶  represents agent j0’s cooperation rate in time period t, 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐶  represents agent j0’s total 
times of cooperation in time period t and 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼  represents agent j0’s total times of actual (not 
potential) interactions in time period t.  
2.3.3 To update self’s unilateral link weights 
At the end of each time step t, each agent updates his unilateral link weights for the next time step 
t+1. At first, ai evaluates each of his neighbor’s cooperation rates only to him according to 
𝑅𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗 =  
 
 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼     (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼 ≠ 0)
   𝛼       (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼 = 0)
           (𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑖) 
𝑅𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗
 represents ai’s evaluation on his arbitrary neighbor aj’s cooperation rate to him in the end of 
time period t. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗
 is the times that ai’s neighbor aj applies “Cooperation” to ai in time period 
t. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼  is the times of ai’s actual interactions with his neighbor aj in time period t. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
 
is ai’s number of neighbors. α is the default cooperation rate estimation and equals 0.2 which is 
used as a proxy for 𝑅𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗  whenever ai has no actual interaction records of his neighbor aj in time 
period t. 
Then ai updates his link weights for the next time period t+1 according to the mechanism below:  
𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡+1 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡+1,𝜏
𝐴𝑃𝐼 =  
𝑅𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗 + 𝛿
  𝑅𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗 + 𝛿 
𝑖+
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
2
𝑗=𝑖−
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
2
=
𝑅𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗 +
1
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
  𝑅𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐶𝑗 +
1
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 
𝑖+
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
2
𝑗=𝑖−
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
2
     
  
(𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑖 , 0 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  and 𝜏 ∈ N+) 
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𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡+1 represents the unilateral link weight that ai assigns to his neighbor aj for the next time 
period. 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡+1,𝜏
𝐴𝑃𝐼  represents the probability that ai actively chooses his neighbor 𝑎𝑗  as his 
potential interaction partner when ai should choose an potential interaction partner within his 
neighborhood in any sub-time period 𝜏 of time period t+1. What is more, we define 𝛿 as 
relation maintenance strength which is a constant and whose direct purpose is matrix completion 
since denominator of each element may be zero. It can also be used for: a) controlling to which 
degree a relationship is maintained over to the next time period even if an agent’s neighbor defects 
in all actual interaction between them in the current time period; b) and at the same time for an 
agent to attach enough importance on neighbors’ cooperation rate in the actual interactions 
between them in the current time period. The link-weights updating rule is created like this 
because embeddedness in social network is an interested parameter in this paper and, hence, it is 
undesirable to totally delete any relationship forever. In this paper, we set 𝛿 = 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡=1 =
1
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 , namely ai’s initial unilateral link weight to his arbitrary neighbor aj, in order to keep 
consistence with the fact that, generally, a neighbor is with less probability to be chosen in a larger 
neighborhood. Change of link weights reflects heterogeneity of links. 
3 Results and analysis 
Parameter values are listed in Table 3. Numbers or matrices for compared parameters in Table 3 
with a short horizontal line underneath are the parameter values used in baseline simulation. 
Comparison of candidate values of each parameter is based on base-line simulation. For every 
parameter value portfolio under investigation, I am interested in the evolution of 1) the sum of 
number of actual interaction of all agents  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1 , 2) the sum of number of cooperation of 
all agents  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  and 3) the difference between them.
1
 All simulations in this paper are 
implemented 800 runs.  
3.1 Baseline simulation 
Before comparison of some parameter values are presented, let us have a quick look at the 
baseline simulation. Figure 1 illustrates the baseline simulation with the min, max, median and 
mean of 800 simulation runs. In the baseline simulation, median and mean values of both 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  of 800 runs decrease first and then soar. The distance of their max 
values and min values are gradually spanning the how range. Median of the differences between 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  decreases first then enlarges and then shrinks again, while its 
mean is relatively stable. 
3.2 Degree of embeddedness in social network  
Four different values are compared for degree of embeddedness in social network, namely se=0.6, 
0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 with the other parameters having the same value with those in the baseline 
simulation. The results of 800 runs are exhibited in Figure 2. Under the experience design in this 
paper,  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  perform better (have higher values) as degree of 
embeddedness in social networks. In the worst situation of se = 0.6, median of both  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1   
                                                             
1 Since each interaction involves 2 agents and each time period contains 20 sub-time periods, the max values of 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  is 4000. 
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Table 3. Parameter values 
Parameters Value / Candidate values 
Unchanged parameters   
Network size 100 
Number of immediate neighbors 6 
Boundary between low trust and high trust 1/2 
Original payoff matrix  
3 1
4 2
  
Base of trust updating (∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 ) 0.005 
Default cooperation rate estimation (α) 0.2 
Relation maintenance strength (𝛿) 1/6 
Number of time periods 50 
Number of sub-time periods 20 
Number of simulation run 800 
Compared parameters   
Degree of embeddedness in social network (se) 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
Mutation probability of payoff structure (mppm) 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 
Mutated payoff structure (Amut)  
3 −3
8 2
 ,  
3 −2
7 2
 ,  
3 −1
6 2
 ,  
3 0
5 2
  
Proportion of high trust agents (pht) 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
Probability of information diffusion in neighbors (pidn) 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0 
Probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors (pidnn) 0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 
Note: The abbreviations in the parentheses for the six compared parameters are what will be used in legends in graphics 
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Figure 1. Baseline simulation.  
 
Figure 2. Comparing degrees of embeddedness in social networks. 
and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  of 800 runs even collapse. 
When degree of embeddedness in social network is higher, interactions more likely happen within 
neighborhood, ceteris paribus. Thus, when degree of embeddedness in social network is higher, 
on one hand, an agent’s trust-updating relates stronger to his fixed neighbors’ trustworthiness; on 
the other hand, an agent has more samples of the interactions with each neighbor, and more values 
of cooperation rate estimation for each neighbor, and more chances for him to update 
trustworthiness, which avoid being locked in low trustworthiness trap. Learnt trustworthiness, then, 
is reflected on interactions. Degree of embeddedness in social network represents an opposite of 
mobility to some extent. Thus, as social mobility accelerates, both trust and trustworthiness 
decrease and may collapse.  
As to the relatively stable gap between mean of  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  of 800 runs, it 
may be attributed to: 1) Information acquisition capability. Assume an agent whose current trust is 
low. If his information acquisition capability via observing (both neighbors and non-neighbors) is 
at the same time low, then he has fewer chances to increase trust and will always not participate in 
actual interactions. 2) Unilateral link weights updating. An agent’s most defective neighbor has 
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less likelihood to be chosen as a potential interaction partner if other neighbors are more 
cooperative.  
3.3 Mutation probability of payoff matrix 
Four candidates are compared for mutation probability of payoff matrix, namely 0.0, 0.1, 0.2 and 
0.3 with the other parameters having the same value with the baseline simulation. The results are 
shown Figure 3. Both  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  soar even with different speed. They 
perform better for mppm = 0 and 0.1 than for mppm = 0.2 and 0.3. 
 
Figure 3. Comparing mutation probabilities of payoff structures.  
The reason why  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  increase under all candidates of mutation 
probability of payoff matrix is that mppm is a conditional probability. That is, it is the probability 
of the original payoff matrix being changed to a mutated one by an initiator of a potential 
interaction on condition that the initiator has already decided to play “Defection” in the 
forthcoming actual interaction, as mentioned before. Therefore, as agents learns to be more 
trustworthy, they choose fewer times of “Defection” for actual interactions. Consequently, the 
probability of changing payoff matrix also gets lower. Because payoff values of a mutated payoff 
matrix enter trust-updating via relative exploitation degree (RED), a mutated payoff matrix 
renders trust-decreasing more severe for a unilateral cooperative party than the original payoff 
matrix. Therefore, it takes more time for trust to recover and arise when mppm is higher, ceteris 
paribus.  
3.4 Mutated payoff matrix 
Four different candidates are compared for mutated payoff matrix, namely  
3 −3
8 2
 ,  
3 −2
7 2
 ,
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3 −1
6 2
  and  
3 0
5 2
  with the other parameters having the same values with the baseline 
simulation. The results are presented in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Comparing mutated payoff matrices. 
As the conflict between a unilateral cooperator and a unilateral defector narrows, both 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  soar with a faster speed. It is because relative exploitation degree 
(RED) amplifies the degree of trust-decreasing as ex post conflict of mutated payoff matrix gets 
stronger, which causes trust to decrease more severe for a unilateral cooperator, cetera paribus.  
3.5 Proportion of high trust agents 
Four candidates are compared for proportion of high trust agents, namely pht = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 
0.9 with other parameters taking the same value with the baseline simulation. The results are 
exhibited in Figure 5.  
The impact of pht is relatively vague, since the figure contradicts our intuition that higher 
proportion of high trust agents could result in better performance and faster take-off speed.  
Except the exception of pht = 0.9, we can roughly say that both  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  
soar faster as pht increases. Since when pht = 0.9,  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  still perform 
very well and shares the same pattern with other candidates, this may not be a problem.  
3.6 Probability of information diffusion in neighbors 
Four candidates are compared for probability of information diffusion in neighbors, namely pidn = 
0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.0 with other parameters taking the same value with baseline simulation. Results 
are shown in Figure 6. Roughly, under the experimental design and parameters value selection, as 
probability of information diffusion in neighbors gets larger, both  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  
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take off faster.  
 
Figure 5. Comparing proportions of high trust agents. 
 
Figure 6. Comparing probabilities of information diffusion in neighbors.  
As aforementioned, observing is an important channel of acquiring information about others’ 
interactions and, at the same time, trust-updating. A characteristic of information diffusion within 
neighborhoods is that informational coverage is relatively small but informational arrival is 
relatively frequent. That is, the impact of information diffusion within neighborhoods is mainly 
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local. Therefore, agents are more likely to have heterogeneous information via observing 
neighbors.  
However, it should be mentioned that the impact of information diffusion, both in neighbors and 
non-neighbors, is a subtle issue. The decisive factor of information diffusion may not be the 
probability but the nature of event getting diffused, namely whether the observed event is a 
trust-increasing one or a trust-decreasing one. As pidn increases, both the chances of observing 
trust-increasing events and trust-decreasing events rise, while trust-decreasing events have larger 
impacts on agents’ trust than trust-increasing events. Thus, the effect of a certain amount of 
trust-decreasing events needs a more quantity of trust-increasing events to compensate. That is, 
the impact of pidn on  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  may depend on the number contrast 
between trust-increasing events and trust-decreasing events. Only when trust-increasing events are 
observed as many times as enough can the two variables of interest soar. The impact of 
information diffusion is embodied more obviously for non-neighbors which is analyzed below. 
3.7 Probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors 
Four candidates are compared for probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors, namely 
pidnn = 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 with other parameters sharing the same value with baseline simulation. 
Results are plotted in Figure 7. It can be seen that  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  is more 
sensitive to probability of information diffusion in non-neighbor than in neighbors. As probability 
of information diffusion in non-neighbors gets larger,  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  take off 
slower. In the worst situation of pidnn = 0.15, median of  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  of 800 
runs even collapse.  
 
Figure 7. Comparing probabilities of information diffusion in non-neighbors. 
As mentioned above, the decisive factor of information diffusion lies in the nature of event getting 
diffused, namely whether the observed event is a trust-increasing one or a trust-decreasing one. 
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This kind of impact is amplified for information diffusion in non-neighbors.  
4 Conclusion 
This paper explores the evolution of interaction and cooperation, supported by individuals’ 
changing trust and trustworthiness respectively, on a directed weighted regular ring from the angle 
of micro scope by using agent-based modeling. This agent-based model takes into account agents’ 
heterogeneity on: 1) trust and trustworthiness; 2) capabilities of acquiring information from 
neighbors and non-neighbors; 3) weights of different kinds of information sources. It also 
integrates several considerations below via relatively delicate experimental design: 1) a 
characteristic of trust is that trust is destroyed easily and built harder (Slovic, 1993); 2) 
trustworthiness may be reflected on both strategy decision and payoff structure decision; 3) 
individuals can decide whether or not to be involved in an interaction; 4) interaction density exists, 
not only between neighbors and strangers (Macy and Skvoretz, 1998), but also within neighbors; 5) 
information diffusion.   
This agent-based model regard trust as the decisive factor of willingness to interact and 
trustworthiness as the decisive factor of probability to cooperate, and applies somehow relatively 
plausible trust-updating, trustworthiness-updating and link-weight-updating mechanism. Marginal 
rate of exploitation of original payoff matrix and relative exploitation degree between two payoff 
matrices are stressed in their influence of trust-destroying; influence of observing is introduced via 
imagined strategy; relation is maintained through relation maintenance strength. 
This paper probes the impact of degree of embeddedness in social network, mutation probability 
of payoff matrix, mutated payoff matrix, proportion of high trust agents and probabilities of 
information diffusion within neighborhood and among non-neighbors in socio-economic process 
on the sum of number of actual interactions and number of cooperation of all agents on the base of 
a baseline simulation. Under the experimental design and parameter values selection in this paper, 
basically as degree of embeddedness in social network, proportion of high trust agents
1
 and 
probability of information diffusion in neighbors increase and as mutation probability of payoff 
matrix, conflict of mutated payoff matrix and probability of information diffusion in 
non-neighbors decrease, simulation performs better.  
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